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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ST~\TE

OF UTi\H, in the interest of:
CARL EVERETT LINDH,
an alleged delinquent child,

Case
No. 9318

Appellant.

BRIEF O·F AP·P·ELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from an order made by the Fifth Juvenile District Court for Grand County, State of Utah,
on June 28, 1960, committing the appellant to the State
Industrial School.
The Record on Appeal consists of the entire file of
the Juvenile Court in said matter. The proceedings before said Court were not transcribed. Said file discloses
that Appellant appeared before said Juvenile Court on
six separate occasions over a period extending from
December 10, 1958, to June 28, 1960. At the time of the
first hearing, a probation agreement in regular form was
signed by the child, his parents, and the Court officers.
Probation 'Yas continued at each hearing thereafter and
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custody remained with the parents until the final hearing
on June 28, 1960, when commitment occurred. At the
fifth hearing, on June 16, 1960, the Court found appellant
to be a delinquent child and ordered
"the child be committed to the State Industrial
School, but suspended on condition that said boy
does not get into further trouble and lives up to all
terms and conditions of his probation, and that his
probation be continued."
On June 22, 1960, Summons and Notice to Parent was
issued preparatory to the hearing on June 28. Said Summons and Notice set forth certain alleged violations of
law by appellant followed by the statement
''that by reason of the foregoing, the said child
did violate the terms and conditions of his probation order and agreement with this Court.''
X o express notice 'vas contained in said Summons and
l\ otice for the parents to sho'v cause 'vhy the suspension
of the commitment to the Industrial School should not be
revoked, or that such action 'vould be considered at said
hearing.
Said Summons and Notice 'vas serYed upon William
Droc~gemcier, the stepfather, on June 24, 1960, and both
hP and the child's mother, l\iildred Droegemeier, appPnred at the hcHring on June ~8th ....A. t the conclusion of
said hearing, the Court made the follo,ving order:
"1. That the aboYe named child be and is hereby
t.h'elared delinquent.
2. Thn t in the best interest of said child, subject
to the continuing jurisdiction of this Court, he be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and is here by : the Court finds the said child has
violated the terms and conditions of his Probation
Agreement and that suspension of the commitment
be refused and that the suspension of Court upon
the commitment of Carl Everett Lindh to the Industrial School hereto made is hereby refused and
that the Raitl child is ordered commited to the State
Industrial School forthwith until he is 21 years of
age unless sooner released.'' (Emphasis added)
At none of the proceedings before said Juvenile
Court was appellant or his parents represented by legal
counsel.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT 1
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE SCOPE OF THE
HEARING TO BE HELD ON JUNE 28, 1960, WAS
NOT GIVEN AND THE COURT CONSEQUENTLY
LACKED POWER TO REVOKE THE SUSPENSION OF THE COMMITMENT TO THE INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL AND SAID COMMITMENT IS
THEREFORE VOID.
PoiNT 2
THE ORDER OF THE JUVENILE COURT IN
THE DECREE DATED JUNE 28, 1960, IS SO
INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN AS TO BE
UNENFORCEABLE.

ARGUMENT
PoiNT 1
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE SCOPE OF THE
HEARING TO BE HELD ON JUNE 28, 1960, WAS
3
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NOT GIVEN AND THE COURT CONSEQUENTLY
LACKED POWER TO REVOKE THE SUSPENSION OF THE COMMITMENT TO THE INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL AND SAID COMMITMENT IS
THEREFORE VOID.
At the hearing on June 16, 1960, the Court found the
boy to be a delinquent child and ordered him committed
to the State Industrial School, but then suspended the
execution of said order and continued the probation, leaYing the boy in the custody of his parents. The Summons
and Notice to Parent subsequently served on June 24,
while listing alleged violations of law and making a general allegation that the child had Yiolated the terms and
conditions of his probation agreement, did not contain any
notice or statement to the effect that revocation of the
suspension order ·w. ould be considered at the hearing on
June 28. The parents had no notice that such revocation
would be an issue and consequently \Yere denied the
opportunity to prepare to meet same and have their ''day
in court.''
Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of Utah provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of la\Y. This right applies
to juvenile as \\'"ell as to ciYil and criminal proceedings.
rrhe Utah Supreme Court in Christiansen Y. Harris, 109
Utah 1, 163 P. 2d 31-! (19-!3) at page 317 lists the minimum essentials of ''due process'' in depri,Ting a person
of liberty and among them states:
'' ( r) notice to the person of the inauguration and
purpose of the 1:nquiry and the time at \Vhich such
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

person should appear if he wishes to be heard'' ;
(Emphasis added)

It is submitted that in the case at hand notice of the
purpose of the inquiry was not given in such manner as
to clearly apprise the participants that revocation of the
~n8pension order "\vould be considered at the hearing.
In State v. Bonza,, 106 Utah 63, 150 P. 2d 970 (1944),
the Utah Court \Vas again called upon to determine what
constitutes "due process" in a revocation of probation
case. The Court stated at page 972 as follows:
"A defendant out of prison on probation is accorded due process of law by the following steps
... : (1) The filing of a verified statement or an
affidavit in the case setting forth facts which show
a violation of the terms of pro ba.tion. ( 2) The
issuance of a;n order to show caruse and citation
thereon requiring the defenda.nt to appear and
show ca.use why probation should not be revoked,
apprising defendant of the ground or grounds on
''Thich revocation is sought, and specifying a
proper time for hearing. (3) A hearing before the
court on the question of violation of some term or
condition of probation, at which the defendant
has the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
against him and also to present evidence to refute
the claimed violation of the conditions of probation. ( 4) A determination of the question, followed
by entry of an appropriate order." (Emphasis
added)
It is submitted that in the case at hand no notice to show
cause \Yhy the order suspending commitment should not
be revoked was given or notice otherwise stating that
such action might be taken at said hearing.
5
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Although not mentioning "due process of law" or
other constitutional guaranties, State v. Zolontakis, 70
Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044 (1927), is an authoritative Utah
case holding that due notice and hearing are essentials
to revocation of suspension of sentence or probation, at
least in a fact situation paralleling that in the instant case.
In the Zolantakis case the defendant's sentence to the
state prison was suspended ''during the good behavior of
the defendant.'' Thereafter a citation was issued requiring the defendant to appear at a time certain and show
cause why the suspended sentence should not be vacated
and set aside. Said citation was returned unserved, but
he was subsequently picked up on a bench warrant. While
in custody a new citation to show cause why the suspended
sentence should not be vacated was issued. Both citations
and the bench warrant were issued without an}'" affidavit,
complaint, or other instrument being made or filed charging defendant " . .ith any lack of good behavior. At the
hearing the suspension of sentence was set aside and defendant was imprisoned. On appeal the Court reversed,
holding that a person having receiYed a suspended sentence during good behavior had a Yested right to rei~. .
thereon and is entitled to a hearing according to "well
recognized and established rules of judicial procedure''
upon the question of whether or not he has complied with
the conditions imposed. In amplification of what is meant
by ''well recognized and established rules of judicial procedure," the Court said at page 1047:
"that defendant is entitled to haYe filed either an
affidavit, motion, or other written pleading setting
forth the facts relied upon for a revocation of the
6
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~uspension

of sentence; that the defendant should
be given an opportunity to answer or plead to the
charge made; that a hearing should be had upon
the issues joined; and that the defendant as well
as the state be given the right of cross-examination. If we are correct in our conclusion that the
defendant has a vested right to his personal liberty
during good behavior when so ordered without
reservation in the original sentence, any proceeding failing in these essentials is error.''
Implicit in the requirement that notice be given of the
facts relied upon for a revocation of the suspension of sentence is the requirement that notice be given that such
revocation shall be the subject of inquiry at said hearing.
Such notice "Tas not given in the case at hand, and as a
consequence appellant's opportunity to defend or present
evidence in his behalf was severely curtailed.
A case holding that an order made by a Juvenile
Court based upon evidence presented in a hearing but
"Thich order was not within the scope of the notice given
for the purpose of the hearing is In. Re Olsen, 113 Utah
365, 180 P. 2d 210 (1947). In this case a petition was filed
alleging a child to be dependent and neglected. Summons
\Yas served on the father who appeared at the hearing
\\'"ith counsel and sought custody of the child. The Court
ruled the father had neglected the child and awarded custody to a third party, and ordered the father to pay $30.00
monthly for the support of the child. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the order as to support even though
testimony was given indicating that he had the ability to
make such payment for the reason that no notice was
given in the summons that the court might inquire into his
7
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ability to support or make such an order. The Court said
at page 216:
''In this case appellant was given no notice that
the court would inquire into his present ability
to support the child or to contribute something to
her support. Apparently, the order made was
based upon evidence which was presented incidental to neglect. No doubt the summons might have
included such notice of inquiry and a statement
that the court might enter some order requiring
the father to support his daughter, but failure to
give such notice in effect deprived appellarnt of his
day in court on that issue. There should have been
some petition or other form of pleading to outline
the scope of the inquiry on the matter." (Emphasis added)
It might be argued in the instant case that the fact
that the Summons and Notice served on the parents alleged that the child violated the terms and conditions
of his probation order and agreement with the court by
inference gave notice that the court would make inquiry
into the question of revocation of the order suspending
commitment. It should be kept in mind, however, that
said court "~as dealing 'Yith lay people "ithout training
in the la'v or particular knowledge or understanding of
legal language or procedures and who were not at any
time during said proceedings represented by counsel,
and as such could not reasonably be expected to make
such an inference or receive such an understanding from
the language used. Also several Summons and Notices
had been issued and served in connection with the prior
hearings, containing the allegation that the child had vio-
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lated the terms and conditions of his probation, but in
paeh instance probation was continued and insofar as the
r<.\eord reveals, commitment to the State Industrial School
\vas not a factor or consideration. Where such circum~tances prevail the Court assuredly has an additional
responsibility to see to it that such language is used in
its notices as is necessary to convey to the ordinary person with clarity and certainty the information to be given.
It is not to be assumed from the record in this matter that
the parents to whom the Summons and Notice was directed, in the absence of clear and unambiguous language
so stating, understood that the court might take the kind
of action which it did at said hearing.

PoiNT

2

THE ORDER OF THE JUVENILE COURT IN
THE DECREE DATED JUNE 28, 1960, IS SO
INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN AS TO BE
UNENFORCEABLE.
The Decree by which appellant was committed to the
Industrial School reads as follows:
"1. That the above named child be and is hereby declared delinquent.
'' 2. That in the best interest of said child, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of this Court,
he be and is here by: the Court :finds the said child
has violated the terms and conditions of his Probation Agreement and that suspension of the commitment be refused and that the suspension of
Court upon the commitment of Carl Everett Lindh
to the Industrial School hereto made is hereby refused and that the said child is ordered committed
9
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to the State Industrial School forthwith until he
is 21 years of age unless sooner released.'' (Embasis added)
It is submitted that the provision ''that suspension of
the commitment be refused and that the suspension of
court upon the commitment of Carl Everett Lindh to the
Industrial School hereto made is hereby refused" is
ambiguous, indefinite, uncertain, and not susceptible of
clear and concise meaning and is therefore without force
or effect.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Juvenile Court
did not give adequate notice that it would make inquiry
into the question of revocation of the order suspending
commitment at the time set for hearing, that by reason
of said omission the Court failed to observe ''due process
of law'' and consequently lacked power or jurisdiction
to make such an order and that the commitment of appellant to the State Industrial School is therefore invalid and
he should be released.
Or if such order be deemed to be 'vithin the power
of said court to make in said circumstances, the actual
order made is so indefinite and uncertain by its terms as
to be unenforceable.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANDSEN AND !~ELLER
By DAN c. KELLER
Attorn.eys for Appellant
Professional Building
Price, Utah
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